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MIXED-MOTIVE MIX-UP—
NON-PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER
TEXAS ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW “UP IN THE AIR”
AFTER FIFTH CIRCUIT’S PETERSON V. BELL HELICOPTER
ALEXANDER P. COHEN*
ALTHOUGH THE TEXAS COMMISSION on Human RightsAct (TCHRA) was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Fifth Circuit made an “Erie guess” as
to whether a plaintiff who fails to achieve any affirmative relief
may nonetheless recover attorney’s fees in its recent mixed-mo-
tive discrimination case, Peterson v. Bell Helicopter (Peterson I).1 Re-
lying on a single Texas appellate court decision, the majority
held that a plaintiff must be the “prevailing party” to recover
fees under both Tex. Lab. Code § 21.259(a) and § 21.125.2 But,
as explained by Judge Dennis in his fiery dissent, that decision
got it wrong.3 Accordingly, this note argues the majority incor-
rectly buttressed Burgmann Seals v. Cadenhead as a wobbly foun-
dation for its Erie guess.4 In doing so, the majority failed to
consider “persuasive data that the highest court of the state
would decide otherwise.”5 Specifically, the statute, in light of
federal case law, by its plain language, and in full context of the
TCHRA scheme, carries no prevailing party requirement.6 By
barring Peterson from recovering fees, the court created uncer-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of law, 2018; B.S., Texas Christian
University, 2015. Alex thanks the SMU Law Review Association for guidance in
publishing this note and his family for guidance in everything else.
1 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson I), 806 F.3d 335 (5th Cir.),
reh’g denied per curiam, 807 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2015).
2 Id. (relying, in large part, on Burgmann Seals Am., Inc. v. Cadenhead, 135
S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)).
3 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson II), 807 F.3d 650, 657 (5th
Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
4 See id.
5 Peterson I, 806 F.3d at 343.
6 See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.125; Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 655 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
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tainty for similarly situated plaintiffs and defendants in the
Texas aerospace industry as to how TCHRA will be applied in
future mixed-motive cases.
Following the loss of a substantial contract with the U.S. Army,
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell) implemented several
rounds of “reduction-in-force” (RIF) layoffs.7 Bell created a sys-
tem of selection criteria to make these cuts that considered met-
rics like sales, impact on organization, and annual reviews.8
David Peterson (Peterson) was a sales manager who was among
the employees let go in Bell’s 2008 RIF.9 While Peterson did
have several negative metrics—including low performance
scores—he contended that Bell let him go, at least partially, due
to his age.10 Peterson thus sued Bell in the Northern District of
Texas for age discrimination under the federal ADEA and state
TCHRA.11 He argued that Bell terminated him due to ageism
and “corporate blame-shifting,” only coming up with a legal ex-
planation ex post facto.12
Partially agreeing with Peterson, the jury determined that
Bell’s decision to lay him off was motivated in part by age.13
However, while the jury found age was a motivating factor, it was
not the sole motivating factor, and other legitimate reasons par-
tially pierced Peterson’s pretext argument.14 In light of the jury
finding “mixed-motive” age discrimination, the district court re-
lied on § 21.125(b) and granted Peterson injunctive relief and
attorney’s fees.15 Bell appealed, taking issue primarily with the
injunction. The Fifth Circuit’s final decision reversed the district
court’s injunction on mainly procedural and fairness grounds
because Peterson failed to add an injunctive relief claim until
after “his case was effectively concluded.”16
Moreover, Bell argued, the majority ultimately accepted, and
this note disputes, that in the absence of a properly granted in-
7 Peterson I, 806 F.3d at 337.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.; Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 2d 846, 850 (N.D.
Tex. 2012) (quoting from the record, a manager allegedly “made age-related re-
marks” about Peterson, “calling [Peterson]—in an uncomplimentary manner—
‘old school.’”) (alterations in original).
11 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2016); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051(1) (West 2015).
12 Peterson I, 806 F.3d at 337–38.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 338–39.
16 Id. at 343.
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junction and any other form of affirmative relief, Peterson could
not recover attorney’s fees under the TCHRA.17 In other words,
Peterson could only recover attorney’s fees under § 21.125(b) if
he was the “prevailing party” at trial.18 The majority leaned on
Cadenhead, a single appellate court decision that thrust a prevail-
ing party requirement from another provision in the TCHRA
(§ 21.259) into § 21.125.19 When followed, Cadenhead forecloses
a plaintiff like Peterson from recovering attorney’s fees under
§ 21.125(b) if he does not otherwise achieve affirmative relief.20
Since the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on this particular
point of law under § 21.125, the majority said Cadenhead served
as an available basis for an Erie guess.21 In so holding, the major-
ity opined it was not “convinced by other persuasive data that
the highest court of the state would decide otherwise[.]”22
Following a denied petition for rehearing en banc in Peterson
v. Bell Helicopter (Peterson II), Judge Dennis eviscerated the major-
ity for what he called a “distortion of both state and federal law
in a published opinion.”23 Without monetary or injunctive relief,
Peterson concededly was not the “prevailing party” under Texas
(and most federal) law.24 But this was not the rub of Judge Den-
nis’s dispute. Instead, Judge Dennis argued whether or not a
party “prevails” does not matter for purposes of recovering fees
under § 21.125.25 So long as the fact finder determined age was
factored somewhat into Peterson’s termination, Judge Dennis
argued, § 21.125(b) allowed Peterson to recover fees.26 Judge
Dennis’s argument was reinforced by authority from a majority
of federal circuits that allow attorney’s fees recovery in mixed-
motive Title VII cases.27 Because Texas emphasizes the role of
Title VII case law in interpreting TCHRA, these federal authori-
ties should have factored heavily into the analysis of fees under
17 Id. at 339, 343.
18 Id. at 342–43.
19 Burgmann Seals Am., Inc. v. Cadenhead, 135 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
20 Id.
21 Peterson I, 806 F.3d at 343.
22 Id.
23 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson II), 807 F.3d 650, 657 (5th
Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 653.
27 Id.; see, e.g., Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 88 F.3d 1332, 1336 (4th
Cir. 1996) (“[Section] 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) [of Title VII] contains no prevailing
party requirement.”).
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§ 21.125.28 Judge Dennis further set up a pure statutory con-
struction argument that § 21.125 cannot possibly be read as hav-
ing a prevailing party requirement.29
In addition, Judge Dennis called Cadenhead a “broken reed”
and lamented the majority’s reliance thereon.30 Because its piv-
otal holding has never been before the Texas high court, and
the opinion itself cites seemingly no authority nor construction
rules in reaching its final conclusion, Judge Dennis said
Cadenhead could not bolster an Erie guess.31 Rather, Judge Den-
nis subscribed to Peterson’s argument on appeal.32 Namely, the
Fifth Circuit’s Garcia v. City of Houston, combined with statutory
construction rules reinforced by the Texas Supreme Court’s
Quantum Chemical v. Toennies, allowed Peterson to recover fees
in a mixed-motive discrimination case without prevailing party
status.33 The majority attacked this argument, saying it “fail[ed]
to account for the Texas Supreme Court’s more recent deci-
sions requiring a party who seeks fees to have obtained some
meaningful relief.”34 Yet, as Judge Dennis stated, the majority
cited no such Texas Supreme Court cases.35 Rather, the “more
recent” cases to which the majority may have been referring do
not stand for the majority’s quoted proposition.36
Presumably, the majority attempted to invoke a case it cited
earlier, Intercontinental v. KB Home, for its proposition that more
recent cases question the wisdom of Garcia under the TCHRA.37
As Judge Dennis alluded, however, the majority read KB Home
out of context.38 KB Home stands for the proposition that a plain-
28 Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 652 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
29 See generally Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR
L. REV. 339, 359–83 (2012) (outlining general rules for construing Texas
statutes).
30 Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 654 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
31 Id. (discussing Burgmann Seals Am., Inc. v. Cadenhead, 135 S.W.3d 854, 861
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)).
32 Id. at 652–54.
33 Garcia v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 672, 677–79 (5th Cir. 2000); Quantum
Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (2016).
34 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson I), 806 F.3d 335, 343 (5th
Cir. 2015).
35 See id.
36 Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650,
653 (Tex. 2009).
37 Id. at 656.
38 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson II), 807 F.3d 650, 654 n.4
(5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
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tiff must obtain affirmative relief to be a prevailing party but not
for the proposition that affirmative relief is a prerequisite for
obtaining attorney’s fees absent an explicit requirement to the
contrary.39 In fact, Texas Supreme Court holdings repeatedly
emphasize the need for an explicit attorney’s fees provision in
the statute itself.40 Thus, the majority’s Erie guess should have
focused on the federal analog and the TCHRA itself.41
Its failure to do so creates uncertainty for plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike in mixed-motive cases, as Peterson I will likely lead
to both forum-shopping and increased litigation cost.42 With
over 153,000 employees, major hubs for aerospace companies
like American Airlines, Lockheed Martin, Southwest Airlines,
and Bell Helicopter, and the largest air sector GDP in the coun-
try, the Texas aerospace industry will incur some of the greatest
uncertainty.43 When the “volatile” air industry ebbs and flows, as
it often does, layoffs are inevitable.44 However, now, if mixed-
motive discrimination is at issue in a TCHRA case, aerospace
defendants with Texas hubs will almost certainly remove the
Texas claim to federal court. Plaintiffs will respond by pleading
all possible forms of relief, even if they do not want or have no
basis to do so, making every effort to “prevail.”45 Additional bur-
dens will detract lawyers willing to take these cases.46 Aerospace
defendants, in turn, will be burdened by additional time and
money spent to defend otherwise unnecessary claims.47 Surely
such a cycle undercuts the purpose of the TCHRA mixed-motive
provision vis-a`-vis Title VII48 and the likely outcome if the same
case was tried in Texas courts.
Because the Texas Supreme Court has not interpreted ele-
ments of a mixed-motive attorney’s fees recovery under
39 Id. (“[In Texas], plaintiff must receive affirmative judicial relief to be consid-
ered a prevailing party.”) (emphasis added) (quoting KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 656
n.27).
40 KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 653.
41 See Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 652–54 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
42 See Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson I), 806 F.3d 335, 343
(5th Cir. 2015).
43 The Texas Aerospace & Aviation Industry, TEXAS WIDE OPEN FOR BUSINESS 1, 2,
6 (2014), http://gov.texas.gov/files/ecodev/Aerospace_Report.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/PGD4-Q7C5].
44 See, e.g., Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
45 See Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 656 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 655–56.
47 Id.
48 Wilson v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc., 361 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
206 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
§ 21.125, the majority in the principal case acknowledged it was
making an Erie guess.49 However, if the Texas Supreme Court
heard Peterson’s case, it likely would have adopted Judge Den-
nis’s reasoning instead of the majority’s for three main
reasons.50
I. DEFERENCE TO FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN
TCHRA CASES
The majority did not acknowledge the deference Texas af-
fords federal law when analyzing statutes modeled after federal
counterparts, such as TCHRA.51 Judge Dennis argued, by relying
on Cadenhead, the majority failed to consider the “special role
that federal law has in guiding the interpretation of the state
provisions.”52 TCHRA was modeled after Title VII. In fact,
§ 21.001 states: “The general purposes of this chapter are to: (1)
provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII . . . .”53
Although the Texas Supreme Court has yet to interpret § 21.125
mixed-motive attorney’s fees, it has repeatedly interpreted
§ 21.001.54 In doing so, it iterated that TCHRA and Title VII are
“nearly identical.”55 Thus, because “analogous federal statutes
and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the
TCHRA,”56 the proper standard for fees under § 21.125 should
have been that used by most federal courts, including the Fifth
Circuit.57
In Garcia, the Fifth Circuit upheld an award of attorney’s fees
in a Title VII case, even though plaintiff obtained no other
meaningful relief.58 There, defendant argued plaintiff should
not be allowed to recover attorney’s fees since plaintiff failed to
recover damages or injunctive relief.59 The Fifth Circuit held an
49 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson I), 806 F.3d 335, 343 (5th
Cir. 2015).
50 See Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 652–55 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
51 See Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001).
52 Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 652–53 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
53 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (West 2015).
54 See, e.g., Quantum Chem. Corp., 47 S.W.3d at 476.
55 Id.
56 Id.; see also Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492
(Tex. 1996) (stating that in TCHRA cases “federal case law may be cited as
authority.”).
57 Garcia v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 672, 677–79 (5th Cir. 2000).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 677. Thus, as in the principal case, the plaintiff in Garcia did not “pre-
vail.” Id.
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“employer’s success in its mixed-motive defense does not in it-
self bar an award of attorneys’ fees.”60 Since Texas draws on fed-
eral law in TCHRA cases, the Texas Supreme Court would
certainly have looked to its federal circuit in interpreting
§ 21.125.61
Further, Garcia comports with the weight of federal authority
addressing fees in Title VII mixed-motive cases.62 For example,
in Wilson v. Nomura Securities International, the Second Circuit re-
lied on Title VII in granting fees, stating § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
“was added to Title VII specifically to address the situation in
which the plaintiff does not receive a damages award at trial but
nonetheless serves a public purpose by ‘proving’ that the defen-
dant acted with discriminatory intent.”63 Peterson I, by contrast,
stripped a similar deterrent mechanism from TCHRA; a deter-
rent that could have easily saved air sector defendants time and
money by avoiding the aforementioned litigation cycle.
II. PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 21.125
In analyzing § 21.125, the majority bypassed statutory inter-
pretation rules that emphasize a plain language analysis of the
statute.64 Accordingly, the court was to “enforce the statute ‘as
written’ and ‘refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose’”
by limiting “analysis to words of the statute and . . . [their] plain
meaning.”65 It should have examined “specific statutory lan-
guage at issue . . . while looking to the statute as a whole, rather
than as ‘isolated provisions’”66 Also, the court could not add ele-
ments to § 21.125, as each omission was to be presumed a
choice.67
60 Id. at 678.
61 Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson II), 807 F.3d 650, 653 (5th
Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
62 See Wilson v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc., 361 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2004); see also
Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) allows a plaintiff to recover fees, even if defendant has a
mixed-motive defense).
63 Wilson, 361 F.3d at 90.
64 Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562–63 (Tex. 2014) (stating
courts “endeavor[ ] to read the statute contextually, giving effect to every word,
clause, and sentence”).
65 Id. (internal citations omitted).
66 Id. (internal citations omitted).
67 See Old Am. Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex.
2004); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).
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Here, TCHRA language only requires success in § 21.125(a)
to be eligible for fees in (b):
In a complaint in which a complainant proves a violation under
Subsection (a) and a respondent demonstrates that the respon-
dent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor, the court may grant declaratory relief, injunctive
relief except as otherwise provided by this subsection, and attor-
ney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to
the pursuit of a complaint under Subsection (a) . . . .68
Therefore, an attorney’s fees award for a mixed-motive claim
under § 21.125 would clearly comply with the plain language of
the statute itself.69 Instead, here, the majority broke these rules
and imputed a prevailing party requirement to § 21.125.70 The
legislature did, by contrast, write such a requirement into
TCHRA § 21.259(a).71 If the legislature wanted a similar re-
quirement in § 21.125, it would have so added, but the omission
is presumed to be intentional.72 Thus, the majority’s holding
usurped rules of construction and legislative intent while creat-
ing confusion.73
III. ADDITIONAL RULES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The majority ignored other fundamental canons of statutory
interpretation by failing to look at the larger statutory scheme.74
Specifically, the majority “should not [have] give[n] one provi-
sion a meaning out of harmony or inconsistent with other provi-
sions, although it might [have] be[en] susceptible to such a
construction standing alone.”75 “Harmony” undergirds two vital
rules that reinforce Judge Dennis’s interpretation of § 21.125.76
68 TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.125 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
69 See Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Peterson II), 807 F.3d 650, 657
(5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (warning a contrary reading
“may lead to [lower court] confusion”).
70 See Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d at 115.
71 TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.259(a) (West 2015) (“In a proceeding under this chap-
ter, a court may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part
of the costs.”).
72 See Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d at 115.
73 See Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 657 (Dennis, J., dissenting); Beal, supra note 29, at
359.
74 Id.; Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001).
75 See Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 493.
76 See Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 653 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (stressing “harmoni-
ous” reading).
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First, it is axiomatic that where there are two provisions within
the same statutory scheme—one general, the other specific—
the specific must control.77 The Texas Supreme Court has deter-
mined, under TCHRA § 21.259, a plaintiff can only recover at-
torney’s fees if he achieves prevailing party status.78 But rules of
construction maintain the general provision (i.e., § 21.259 gov-
erning disputes generally) must yield to the more specific provi-
sion (i.e., § 21.125 governing only disputes involving mixed-
motive).79 Second, the “Rule Against Surplusage” canonically
disallows courts from interpreting a statute in a way that would
render some or all of it superfluous or hollow in light of another
portion.80 As Judge Dennis discussed, the provisions in the
TCHRA were crafted by the state legislature to be “distinct and
complementary; rather than conflict, they supplement each
other.”81 If § 21.259 were to control every dispute seeking attor-
ney’s fees under TCHRA, there would be no purpose for
§ 21.125(b) to discuss such fees in a mixed-motive context.82
In conclusion, Judge Dennis was concerned this holding
would lead to fewer lawyers willing to try mixed-motive cases and
more—otherwise vexatious—injunctions filed to preserve the
possibility of prevailing.83 While the majority’s holding threatens
willingness of trial lawyers to take similar employee discrimina-
tion claims, the larger concern is a “distortion of both state and
federal law.”84 The Fifth Circuit’s failure to follow federal case
law and Texas construction rules has disconcerting implications.
Aerospace employees and corporations based in Texas should
take special note. As an “exceptionally volatile” sector with a
strong Texas presence and a great deal of interdependency be-
tween employees and employers,85 this confusion between Texas
and federal law will likely affect the way in which mixed-motive
77 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.026(b) (West 2015); see, e.g., Forwood v. City of Tay-
lor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285–86 (Tex. 1948).
78 See, e.g., El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012).
79 See Forwood, 214 S.W.2d at 285–86.
80 TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, No. 15-0143, 2016 WL 3136877, at *5
(Tex. June 3, 2016), reh’g denied (Sept. 23, 2016) (courts must “consider the stat-
ute as a whole, giving effect to each provision so that none is rendered meaning-
less or mere surplusage.”).
81 Peterson II, 807 F.3d at 653 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
82 See id.
83 Id. at 655–56.
84 Id. at 657.
85 See, e.g., Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 409 (10th Cir. 1992).
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litigation occurs each time aerospace layoffs take place. Indeed,
the court has left potential parties up in the air.
